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Introduction  
The end of the Cold War led to vastly reduced tensions between the United States 
and the former Soviet Union. Yet the new era has been marked by the rise of ethnic and 
religious disputes, as well as tendencies to resort to unilateral and isolationist measures. 
Such an ongoing tumult of change necessitates that traditional policies be seriously 
reconsidered and, perhaps, drastically reevaluated. Old ways of thinking no longer apply 
to the world we live in. As a country that has historically proposed new ways of thinking 
about international security1, Canada is well-placed to help usher in new approaches. 
This article suggests some strategies that Canada could pursue while it is a member of the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council over the next eighteen months.2  
 
Canada’s Approach at the UN toward Peacekeeping 
Enhance Canada’s Peacekeeping Reputation: 
 Canada’s peacekeeping role through the UN is justifiably a great source of 
national pride for Canadians. In the past, peacekeeping helped develop a positive 
reputation for Canada. It also distinguished Canadians from Americans, who until 
recently did not participate in peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping allowed Canada to 
assert an independent role in the international arena and came to reflect distinctively 
Canadian values. “Canadians have always seen peacekeeping as an important part of 
their identity and of their country’s position on the international stage, even when 
peacekeeping meant little to much of the international community.”3 
 Yet during the 1990s, peacekeeping became the subject of an unrelenting cross-
examination by the media and the public. It became difficult to perceive Canadian 
peacekeepers as heroes in situations—especially with the revelation of the murder of a 
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Somali teen in a Canadian camp. The Liberal government under Prime Minister Jean 
Chretien can be faulted for having failed to get to the bottom of the imbroglio. 
Complicating matters further, the reputation of some members of the Department of 
National Defence (DND) was marred and some were accused of a cover-up. Moreover, 
former Defence Minister Doug Young abruptly ended an inquiry the Liberals themselves 
had established. What could the government do to improve the Canadian Forces’ 
approach to peacekeeping, and thus enhance Canada’s reputation at the UN Security 
Council for peacekeeping? 
• The Canadian Forces’ preparations for peacekeeping are insufficient and ad hoc. 
Until recently, the Forces relied on little training and scant peacekeeping doctrine; the 
emphasis was upon combat-capability. The Canadian government should ensure that 
all ranks of the Canadian Forces receive increased training in conflict resolution 
and negotiation skills so as to help avert dangerous situations before combat skills 
become necessary. The more peacekeeping operations combine military and 
humanitarian objectives, the more combat capabilities will diminish in importance. 
This is not to say that Canadian peacekeepers should not receive any multi-purpose, 
combat-capable training. Simply that all ranks, not just officers, need more 
peacekeeping training. 
• The Canadian government should ensure that the Defence Department spends 
significantly more on peacekeeping. The difficulties that the DND is experiencing 
within the current budget are not a result of the cost of peacekeeping operations. The 
incremental cost of such operations is $100-150 million a year—roughly the same 
amount as the government spends on the Air Cadet, Army Cadet, and Sea Cadet 
youth programmes.4 
• Other countries, including the United States, are participating more heavily in 
peacekeeping than in the past. If the Canadian government wishes to continue to be 
taken seriously at the UN, as a valued voice on the future of peacekeeping, it should 
increase Canada’s current commitment to peacekeeping, relative to the rest of the 
world. Canada must not rest on its laurels as other countries develop more expertise. 
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Improve Canada’s Peacekeeping Training Centre: 
 Canada could do more to help UN member states adjust to rapid changes in the 
nature of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping duties now include the monitoring and 
administration of elections, preventive deployment, humanitarian and human rights 
functions, the enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions, and nation-building 
mandates. The burden of peacekeeping for the UN has dramatically increased over the 
1990s—and Canada is well-positioned to ensure that new UN Security Council initiatives 
reflect this new reality. This middle power has valuable experience and knowledge that 
could be used to reshape the UN and other multilateral institutions in the new era. 
However, Canadian institutions and peacekeeping infrastructure remain much the same in 
Canada as they were during the Cold War, despite the explosion of new operations.  
• The promising concept of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre must be fully developed and implemented as its 
original architects intended.5 The Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre is currently 
only a shell of what it could be. The Chretien government arguably implemented it 
purely for electoral purposes, not to make real changes to the military’s approach to 
peacekeeping. 
• The Canadian government must ensure that the Pearson Peacekeeping Training 
Centre in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia becomes widely regarded as one of the best 
peacekeeping training centres in the world, an invaluable resource for the 
Canadian Forces, Defence Department, and peacekeepers worldwide. It must become 
a centre of learning for all ranks--not just a place for officers and civilians to share 
peacekeeping ideas and experiences. 
  
 In the 1993 election campaign, the Liberals expressed their intent, if elected, to 
strengthen Canada’s leadership role in international peacekeeping. They intended to do 
this, in part, through a reorientation of Canadian defence policy and procurement 
practices to emphasize the key priority of peacekeeping. The Liberals also promised to 
give priority to Canadian efforts to improve the UN’s policies on peacekeeping. The 
government claimed to be committed to multilateralism and world citizenship through 
participation in peacekeeping. 6 Over the last seven years, however, Canada’s 
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peacekeeping reputation has not increased but suffered from declining morale and an 
endless mire of questions and recrimination. There has been little, if any, progress toward 
these original goals. 
• If the Canadian government wants to be taken seriously at the UN Security Council, 
it needs to act quickly to rejuvenate faith and support in the Canadian Forces by 
enacting a defence policy in favour of peacekeeping and multilateralism, not 
isolationism and tacit support of American unilateralism. 
 
Canada’s Attitude at the UN toward UN Finances 
Press UN Members to pay Dues on Time: 
 The UN continues to experience a funding crisis due to member states’ failure to 
honour their financial obligations. Member states of the UN invest an average of $1.40 in 
UN peacekeeping activities for every $1000 spent on their own armed forces. For 
example, for every dollar that it has invested in UN peacekeeping, the United States has 
tended to spend over $2000 on its own military.7 In fact, the UN’s entire 1995 
peacekeeping budget was less than 1 percent of the $868 billion in military spending by 
all the governments of the world combined.8 
 Where should Canada stand on the issue of UN finances? Canada has consistently 
paid its regular and peacekeeping dues to the UN. It is time to press other member states 
to enact Article 19 of the UN Charter. This article states that a member which is in 
arrears for more than two years shall be barred from having a vote in the General 
Assembly. 
• Canada should vigorously press members of the General Assembly to enact 
Article 19 against recalcitrant members of the UN General Assembly and the 
Security Council. Although Canada is the United States’ closest ally, friendship 
should not blind it to the fact that the US owes approximately $1.3 billion dollars to 
the UN’s regular budget and the peacekeeping budget.9 
• Canadian officials should consider threatening to halt payment for the costs of 
NATO enlargement until the United States agrees to its fair share of UN spending. 
If high-level American officials admonish Canadians for reduced spending on 
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defence, Canadians should remind them of the United States’ failure to pay its UN 
dues.  
 
Canada’s Approach in the UN Security Council toward European Security 
Ensure Significant NATO Reform: 
 Many people refer to the UN as a fifty-year old institution in need of reform. But 
NATO is also a middle-aged institution in need of reform. Wholesale reform will not 
work. Reforms must be cumulative, built gradually on existing foundations. For instance, 
the decision to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the alliance is one 
kind of reform. The establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Council and the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act are others. But NATO needs further transformation of its structures and 
procedures if it is to serve the common security interests of the allies and others. 
• Canada’s first priority should be not to create new dividing lines. A reformed NATO, 
which did not aim to include the most powerful country in Europe, Russia, would be 
fatally flawed. The Canadian government should strive to engage NATO and Russia 
in an active, cooperative relationship that would form the cornerstone of a new, 
inclusive security structure in Europe. Canada must act quickly through the UN and 
other multilateral institutions, such as the G-8 and the International Monetary Fund, 
to invite Russia into Western security and economic structures. 
• NATO’s air attack on Serbia and Kosovo has made it even more imperative that the 
alliance makes a supreme effort to welcome Russia into European decision-making 
circles. Russia has suspended all contacts with NATO and taken its soldiers in Bosnia 
from under NATO command. Russia’s decision to step back from involvement in 
NATO, within hours of the attack on the former Yugoslavia, is further indication that 
the provisions of the NATO-Russia Founding Act are insufficiently attractive for 
Russia to remain engaged in discussions at Brussels. Russia will need more 
incentives and more reassurance. And Canada with its large expatriate Russian, 
Ukrainian, and Serbian populations is well-equipped to promote stronger ties. 
Through UN and NATO auspices, Canada should press the allies within NATO to 
reassure Russia by offering it a special relationship in NATO. Incentives could 
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include formally embedded consultation mechanisms, a mutual non-aggression 
pledge, and a promise to develop non-offensive defence systems. 
 
It needs also to be remembered that the first round of NATO expansion took place in 
the spring of 1999 without widespread Russian approval. We continue to run the risk of 
inciting old hatreds and new insecurities. The Russian leadership remains unstable. 
General Alexander Lebed waits impatiently in the background. Consequently, the 
Canadian government should refrain from pushing for a second round of NATO 
enlargement. Rather than suggest that Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Baltic 
countries be invited into the alliance, Canada should hold-back. To urge further NATO 
expansion beyond Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic would contribute to the 
situation Canada does not want—a more paranoid and insecure Russian leadership and 
population. The alliance should postpone any decisions about new members to avoid 
further tensions with Russia, a strong opponent of the air war against Yugoslavia and of 
NATO expansion. 
• Canada should counsel the United States and the other NATO allies to delay opening 
the door to further NATO enlargement until the Russian leadership considers 
that it is an integral part of Europe’s emerging security architecture. 
• The Canadian government could also re-emphasize at the UN the objectives 
underlying NATO’s Article 2, which recommends in part that the allies contribute 
toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations, 
strengthen their free institutions, promote conditions of stability and well-being, and 
encourage economic collaboration. The Canadian government should emphasize the 
ideas embodied in that article, and help transform NATO from a collective defence 
organization into an alliance of free and democratic nations intent upon ending 
East-West confrontation.  
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Canada’s Approach in the UN Security Council toward Asserting Sovereignty 
New Ways to Assert Arctic Sovereignty: 
 Canadians cannot afford to sit idly by while their sovereignty in the Arctic is 
undermined. Yet Canada’s concept of asserting Arctic sovereignty must move away from 
the traditional notion of defending the North against ‘threats,’ such as the former Soviet 
Union, towards an emphasis on sovereignty association very broadly defined. The skies 
above the Arctic have decreased, not increased, in strategic significance, as have 
Northern waters. Canada should police its Arctic territory, skies, and waters, but the way 
in which the government asserts sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago needs to be re-
examined. 
• The Canadian government could consider purchasing a few previously-used 
icebreakers from Russia, ones that are capable of penetrating Arctic ice that is at 
least eight feet thick. According to the Canadian Coast Guard, its fleet of six 
icebreakers is only operational in the north during the summer months from July to 
November.10 Some second-hand non-nuclear Russian icebreakers would be able to 
assert effective control of Arctic waters year-round. The Canadian Coast Guard and 
Canadian Navy could use the icebreakers to navigate Arctic waters during the winter 
season, thus enhancing Arctic sovereignty in a peaceful and responsible fashion. 
 
 Some have argued that diesel submarines are essential tools to assert sovereignty. 
But diesel submarines promise to be an ill-considered choice. The four used British 
Upholder Class submarines that the Liberal government plans to acquire between 2000 
and 2002 will probably have to be expensively refitted, at an additional cost of 
approximately $1.27 billion (Cdn), in order to extend the life of their equipment and to 
operate under Arctic ice. Add to that the original purchase price of $750 million and 
Canada has a submarine programme that may cost it more than $2 billion.11 
The argument that the submarines are necessary to protect Canada’s security and 
sovereignty underwater is less than persuasive, if not another red herring. Even at the 
height of the Cold War (when there was a credible threat), officials could not be sure of 
what was happening in all of Canada’s territorial waters, particularly in the Arctic. They 
had to assume that there were occasional intrusions by our allies and others. However, 
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these were not sufficient to undermine Canadian sovereignty or security. Even if the 
Upholder submarines happen to detect or intercept an intruder, Canada’s options will 
remain exceedingly limited. Officials might get on the ‘diplomatic horn’ and complain. 
They might ‘ping’ the offending submarine with sonar and ask it to leave. Or, as a last 
resort, they could respond with force by launching a wire-guided torpedo, risking 
retaliation and potential escalation. No Canadian government would consider this option 
in peacetime.  
 Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of the British Upholder submarine as a multi-
purpose resource that provides the wide range of options and secondary service that was 
advertised. In fact, these subs will have fairly narrow operational limitations. They are of 
little use in waving the flag and demonstrating a presence for sovereignty protection. 
They are seldom helpful in search and rescue operations. They have yet to be needed in 
any peacekeeping mission. Further, their purported contributions to surveillance, 
monitoring, and fisheries protection roles can be far more cost-effectively performed by 
other means. The Aurora aircraft, for example, can cover considerably more territory in 
less time at less expense. In short, so far no one has demonstrated a compelling scenario 
or a convincing case for buying the submarines.12 
• The Canadian government needs to take a more pro-active (and less expensive) 
approach at the UN toward asserting Arctic sovereignty and managing our territory 
wisely. Canada should not militarize the North, merely increase its presence there. 
Purchasing and operating more icebreakers in the circumpolar north, rather than 
refitting the diesel submarines, would be a cost-effective and peaceful method of 
doing so. 
 
Canada’s Approach at the UN toward New Security Threats and Challenges: 
Reconsidering the Nature of the Threat: 
 The UN Security Council needs to reconsider and reevaluate perceived threats to 
the international community. Who is threatened, by whom, and how? For a while, the 
fact that there was no longer a significant Soviet threat implied that security could be 
preserved at much lower levels of defence spending. Now the threat from Saddam 
Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic has led to calls, especially by some Americans, for 
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greater defence spending. US President Bill Clinton plans to increase the defence budget 
this year by hundreds of billions of dollars, in the largest hike in peacetime history.13  
Most recently, the US Ambassador to Canada had the temerity to lecture Canadians about 
the need to increase their defence spending.14 
 Rather than respond in a knee-jerk fashion to the United States’ remonstrations, 
Canada should implement new kinds of defence preparations that are considered vital to 
Canadian—and concomitantly the international community’s—concerns. The 
government needs to think carefully about how it will spend its defence dollars and 
where: Is there any need to prepare for high-intensity conflict, as Canada did during the 
Cold War, and still does? When and how should the country contribute to UN-sanctioned 
mid-intensity conflicts, such as the Gulf War? What kinds of Canadian defence 
preparations might be perceived as offensive and provocative, rather than defensive and 
necessary? Canada’s parliament has recently released a report calling for a re-
examination of NATO’s reliance on nuclear deterrence and the New Strategic Concept.15 
Many other similarly pressing security issues loom on the horizon. Questions are already 
being raised about how much Canada should contribute to the costs of NATO 
enlargement.16 More defence spending may also be deemed necessary if the government 
decides to become deeply involved in American space initiatives and ballistic missile 
defence. 
• The Canadian government needs to reconsider all these sorts of questions in light 
of the new types of threats and challenges the international community now faces. 
During its tenure as a UN Security Council member, the government should hold a 
nation-wide security forum designed to solicit all types of Canadian opinion on 
these sorts of important questions. Rather than sponsor intermittent conferences, 
where academics, graduate students, and representatives of Non-Governmental 
Organizations meet for a few hours at great expense due to high travel and 
accommodation costs, a web-site on the Internet could be used to democratize the 
discussion and promote nation-wide participation. The website could be 
sponsored and maintained by the Privy Council Office, in conjunction with 
information officers from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
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Trade and the Department of National Defence, however, it would be open to all 
Canadians.  
 
For decades Canada’s assessment of the threat has been shaped and influenced by 
American military threat analysis. It can be argued that it is time for Canada to undertake 
more of its own independent military threat analysis.17  
• The government needs to institute the infrastructure and procedures necessary for 
Canada to carry out its own independent threat analysis under the auspices of 
Canadian security institutions such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
(CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), and the Defence 
Department. In conjunction with UN monitoring agencies and international watchdog 
institutes, Canada could unite with like-minded nations to provide the UN Security 
Council with timely and accurate threat assessments based on new information 
(and possibly conflicting analyses of the threat). Such alternative threat assessments 
might play a valuable role in ameliorating tensions and defusing arms spirals in the 
weeks and months preceding possible multilateral or unilateral actions, such as air 
strikes. 
 
Threats to North American Security: 
 The decline of the Soviet threat has also meant that the North American 
Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) is no longer as important to Canadian security. 
Some argue that the war against illicit narcotics is ongoing, and that the Canadian 
military must work through NORAD to interdict drugs. To some extent, this argument 
serves to quell questions about the future purpose and intentions of NORAD. 
Nevertheless, concerns are being raised about Canada’s possible contribution to the US 
military’s global surveillance, warning, and communications systems.18 The government 
needs to be especially careful that it is not perceived to be intent upon erecting some kind 
of ‘Fortress America.’ 
• The Canadian government should maintain its official position of nonparticipation 
in active missile and space-based defence programs.  Canadian officials need to 
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assure other countries that there is no anti-ballistic missile system in any way 
connected to the NORAD agreement. 
• Canada should re-emphasize its commitment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
and, if it chooses to stay in NORAD over the long-term, the government must ensure 
that aspects of the missile defense program associated with NORAD do not violate 
the ABM Treaty. 
 
Nuclear and Conventional Challenges to Canada and the World’s Security 
The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation: 
 Fears of instability in Russia have been heightened by the ailing health of 
President Yeltsin, Russia’s falling ruble, the possibility of widespread food shortages, as 
well as the threat of political extremism. The possibility of nuclear weapons falling into 
the wrong hands has never been greater. As Russian General Aleksandr Lebed recently 
told President Clinton during his visit to Moscow, Russia today faces a greater threat than 
in 1917 on the eve of the Russian Revolution. As Lebed warned, “the situation is worse 
than in 1917. Now we have huge stockpiles of poorly guarded nuclear weapons.”19 
Desperate conditions exist in nuclear cities and biological institutes across Russia. 
Moreover, weapons scientists and engineers are not being paid. The sale of nuclear 
weapons, materials, technology, and the flight of nuclear scientists to other countries may 
increase. A sharp drop in weapons research spending has left thousands of scientists, 
engineers, and technicians in near poverty.20 
• Canada should work with other like-minded UN member states through the 
International Scientific and Technical Center (ISTC) in the former Soviet Union to 
provide Russian scientists with more long-term research grants and programs 
that promote alternative civilian employment.21 
• Canada should also propose that an international registrar of scientists be set-up 
through the UN to track the research activities of all scientists in the world. Similar 
to the UN Arms Registrar, cooperation would have to be voluntary (in order to 
preserve academic freedom). However, over time such a registrar could contribute to 
increased transparency, openness, and scientific security. 
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 What can be done at the UN Security Council to further enhance Russia’s nuclear 
stability? Much of the problem stems from Russia’s weakness, not its strength. As the 
Russian Duma’s Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Defense, Alexei G. Arbatov, 
asserted in the spring of 1998, “Not since 1941 has the Russian military stood as 
perilously close to ruin as it does now…. If Russia’s mammoth military-industrial 
establishment were to collapse—a distinct possibility in the new few years—the 
consequences would be not less devastating than were the events of June 1941 [German 
invasion], and not only for Russia but for the entire world.”22 High-level American 
officials who have recently visited some Russian nuclear sites have also expressed strong 
concerns about the safety of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Adding to fears is the prospect that 
Russia has little time and comparatively few resources to deal with potential Year 2000 
computer problems that might affect missile operations.23 
• The Canadian government should contribute at least one thousand computer 
experts, along with substantial travel and research funds, to a large-scale UN-
sponsored initiative that would deploy knowledgeable computer personnel to Russia 
to work on their military’s computer equipment.  
• The Canadian government should also press Russia to continue to centralize control 
of its nuclear arsenal and consolidate nuclear weapons on Russian soil. 
• More technological and monetary assistance for Russia is necessary. The US has 
already spent $1.6 billion to improve the safe storage of Russia’s nuclear materials, 
provide assistance in transporting and dismantling nuclear weapons, and create new 
research opportunities for Russia’s nuclear weapons specialists.24 The Canadian 
government should promise an additional $50 million in order to avoid a nuclear 
tragedy from occurring. It might also issue a challenge to other rich nations in the UN 
Security Council, such as the United Kingdom and The Netherlands, to contribute 
substantial amounts.  
• With like-minded nations, the government could also sponsor anti-leakage programs 
at Russian nuclear facilities. As a non-nuclear player, Canada would be perceived as 
a neutral third party genuinely interested in reducing leakage of information and 
nuclear materials from Russian nuclear storage and launching sites. 
 
 13
The Threat of Conventional Weapons Proliferation: 
 Canada is the seventh largest contributor in the world to the arms trade and arms 
trafficking. Despite the end of the Cold War, it has an over-sized military industry that 
promotes Canadian wares with zeal. The Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions are 
engaged in regional arms races. Countries like Saudia Arabia are flush with petrodollars 
and demand Canadian defence products. Canadian companies such as Bombardier, 
General Motors, and Magellan Aerospace Corporation are contributing to the worldwide 
arms race in acquiring conventional weapons.25  
• If Canada wants to continue sponsoring important disarmament measures at the UN, 
it needs to actively discourage its own domestic manufacturing industries from 
seeking military contracts in the Asia-Pacific and Middle Eastern regions. Negative 
inducements could include the elimination of government subsidies and grants 
through the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC), an Ottawa-based crown 
corporation that assists Canadian companies with export sales to foreign governments 
and international organizations. As well, the government needs to close loopholes 
that permit tax breaks for research and development for military purposes.  
• Government trade missions and foreign service officers in DFAIT should also be 
actively discouraged from promoting significant military industry contracts overseas. 
 Since the 1950s Canada has become an important supplier of assemblies, 
components, and sub-components to arms manufacturers in the United States. Canada has 
moved into the development of dual-use technologies and products. 
• Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy’s proposals to eliminate landmines and curtail 
small arms have earned Canada widespread admiration. If Canada wants to continue 
to be a respected proponent of disarmament and arms control initiatives at the UN, 
then its defence industry production and the export of dual-use technologies need 
to be curtailed. The Canadian government could also explore the development of a 
multilateral database that could serve as a tracking and early warning system 
for dual-use exports.26 
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Canada’s Approach at the UN toward Worldwide Defence Spending 
Maintain Low Levels of Defence Spending: 
 To some extent Canada can justify any exhortations it makes at the UN to 
decrease worldwide defence spending because it has made a laudable effort to constrain 
its own defence expenditures. The Canadian defence budget decreased from $12.83 
billion in 1991-92, to $11.97 billion in 1993-94, to $9.9 billion in 1997-98. The end of 
the Cold War, as well as Canada’s large debt and deficit justified these reductions. 
However, high-level Americans, such as the US Ambassador to Canada, are already 
emphasizing the need to increase overall military spending.27 Rather than sharply increase 
defence spending on capital and equipment, Canadian Cabinet Ministers should take into 
consideration that Canada would set a poor example which other states could follow. 
• Canada’s continuing fiscal problems, and its prominent role over the next eighteen 
months at the UN, should constrain policy options. Increasing defence spending is 
not an option for responsible policy-makers. 
 
For many years, Canada’s defence spending has been less than 1.5 percent of GDP. In 
1997, the United States spent  3.6 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on 
defence while Canada spent 1.3 percent—approximately the same percentage as 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Spain.28 Canadian defence lobbyists bemoan the 
country’s low level of spending but the European allies have similarly cut-back. In 1997, 
each Canadian paid $274 (US) for defence while each American paid $838. But the 
United States is a superpower with world-wide defence interests. Canada has a 
population of barely 30 million yet spends more per capita on defence than Portugal, 
Spain, and Turkey, and approximately the same as Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and 
Italy.29  
• The government should be prepared to announce that it cannot afford to spend 
more on defence at the same time as social and health care programmes continue to 
be cut. 
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The Worldwide Refugee Crisis: A Threat to International Security 
Share the Burden and Help Reduce the Number of Refugees: 
 The world’s refugee population is fast becoming a crisis of epic proportions. At 
present there are approximately 15 million official ‘refugees’ under the Geneva 
Convention and similar arrangements. In addition, there are perhaps upward of 20 million 
people who are not afforded the same official protection, but are ‘in refugee-like 
situations’. Another, even larger category is that of the ‘internally displaced,’ whose 
number has risen to perhaps 26 million or more—although statistics on this are 
uncertain.30 Those who are forced to flee their homes require food and medical aid, 
depress the living standards of local communities, may contribute to environmental 
destruction, and can even encourage ethnic and cultural animosities. Most discouraging is 
that if regional anarchy increases, as we have seen in the Balkans, the numbers of those 
in flight will abruptly rise. Canada and the rest of the world community must help stem 
the flow and alleviate suffering. 
• The Canadian government could help set up organized observer corps in countries 
and along borders deemed to be a potential source of refugee-producing conflict. By 
providing an early warning system of well-trained UN personnel, peace-promoting 
measures could be introduced before individuals are forced to flee their homes. Some 
developing countries perceive early warning as opening the door wide for Northern 
interference in their internal affairs. But by trying to promote humanitarian early 
warning, the Canadian government has been acting with foresight—at the same time 
as government officials have been mindful that there were UN warnings of the 
Rwanda disaster three years before it happened. 
• Another recommendation might be for Canada to work harder through the UN to 
foster broad-based economic development, since the relationship of refugeeism to 
underdevelopment is direct and undisputed.31 Lessening poverty will likely reduce 
the number of refugees. Canada’s foreign aid budget now amounts to about 0.31 
percent of the country’s economic output, down from 0.50 percent 10 years ago. 
Once the fifth most generous of the world’s 21 richest nations, Canada now ranks 
ninth. As the President of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation has 
stated, “Given that we want to play an international leadership role, and given how 
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pleased we were to be elected to the [UN] Security Council, we should put in the 
resources that would allow us to play that role.”32 
• Canada could also advocate establishing an organized system of burden sharing, 
whereby all the world’s nations would contribute to supporting refugees by 
allocating money to the countries that end up housing them. Despite internal 
weaknesses, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), and the UN Human Rights 
Commissioner and Centre, deserve more widespread support. This would relieve 
pressure on the poorest of Third World countries that are often overwhelmed by 
refugee populations, despite their lack of resources.33  
  
Conclusion: 
 Canada has limited time and a small window of opportunity to take advantage of 
its prominent seat in the UN Security Council. It is highly unlikely that it will be re-
elected to the position for at least another ten years (e.g. until at least 2010). Currently, 
the Liberal government under Jean Chretien is well-equipped to make important changes 
to national and international security, in part because it has appointed a Foreign Minister 
with a vision of the world as it could be, not as it is. In the tradition of many Canadian 
idealists before him, such as former Minister of External Affairs Howard Green and 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Axworthy is seeking to strengthen the UN and work 
toward peace and disarmament. Not everyone will agree on the best methods and most 
efficient means of achieving these commonly-valued objectives. But Canada has a duty 
and responsibility to put forward new ideas at the UN to enhance international and 
national security. As Professor James Eayrs suggested over thirty years ago in Fate and 
Will in Foreign Policy: 
Force is the monopoly of the Great Powers, for all the good it does them. But 
Great Powers enjoy no monopoly over ideas. The foreign minister of a small state 
may not be able to summon a gunboat in aid of his diplomacy, to carry a big stick 
let alone to brandish it. But he can carry a briefcase well enough, and stock it with 
proposals.34 
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